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School Examples and Curricular Entanglements in
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, other Pragmateiai, and Plato’s
Theaetetus: The Case of the Snub Nose
Gyburg Uhlmann
1 Introduction: Snub nose, and what?
Aristotle starts the argumentation in Ζ 5 of hisMetaphysics with an example:1 the
example of the snub nose. It is meant to further elaborate considerations in Ζ 4
about the possibility to explore definitions of composites from another perspec-
tive. Aristotle makes very clear that composite does not simply equal composite,
for there are several ways in which something can be said to be composed out of
a plurality. What is at stake in these approaches and trial runs is the conceptual
unity of something that is said to be a being and therefore has to be – in some
way – self-for-itself, i.e. self-subsistent.2
That is the case for the substances (ousiai), for the very reason that they exist
independently from other things – and Aristotle asks what the constitutive reason
for this self-sufficiency is ontologically – but is it also the case for objects that are
not only one thing but include two or more properties? This first approach needs
further distinctions, since there are many ontologically different cases of plural
entities, and it is Aristotle’s concern in these questions and answers to bring light
into the darkness of this plurality.
Our example3 is used to grasp the necessity of distinguishing between pri-
mary and secondary definables and definitions and to reconcile them with each
1I am grateful to Carolyn Kelly for correcting linguistic weaknesses of an earlier draft of this
paper.
2Cf. Ζ 1, 1028a13-15; 1028a25-27; 1028a29-33; 1028b2-7.
3D.M. Balme, The Snub, Ancient Philosophy 4 (1984) 1-8; Phil Corkum, Critical Notice of Michail
Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2011, 2013, in: Canadi-
an Journal of Philosophy 43 (1): 136-156; Michail Peramatzis, Matter in Scientific Definitions in
Aristotle, in Oxford Handbooks Online. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013-4; id., Priority
in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; id., Essence and Per Se Predica-
tion in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.4, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 39, 2010, 121-182;
Michael Frede and Günther Patzig (Frede, Michael / Patzig, Günther. Aristoteles ‘Metaphysik Z’.
Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (in 2 volumes), München, C.H.Beck, 1988 (=Frede/Patzig);
1
other and explore their limits by looking for a clear distinction and a link between
different cases of ontological plurality.
Aristotle uses this example in the different contexts of several treatises and
disciplines to explain and analyze particular questions: twice in the Physics4, in
Ζ 5, Ζ 10, Ζ 11 of the Metaphysics, in Ε 1 of the Metaphysics, in De anima III
(429b10-14), once in the Rhetoric in a political context,5 once in the Politics6,
and in the Sophistici Elenchi (13, 173b1-16; 31, 181b35-182a6). Therefore, it is
necessary to understand what the status of this example is.
In this paper I will present the different contextualizations and functions
of the example and argue that it is part of Aristotle’s tool box in his school
practices, for which it is characteristic that there is no such thing as a regular or
standard use of examples but that it is in and by their particular context that the
examples obtain their functions and shapes. The transfer from one context to
another presupposes –mutatis mutandis – a certain knowledge and acquaintance
with the usability and functions of the examples in other contexts, and works
with this presupposed knowledge.
However, i.e. despite the fact of specifically applied and transferred use, it is
crucial to understand that these dynamic practices in which the audiences are ac-
tively involved are constitutive for the way Aristotle teaches and does philosophy.
Therefore, the snub nose and other examples must be called school examples be-
cause of (and not in spite of) their dynamic character. We must therefore include
in our analyses institutional contexts, and audiences and readers in regard to
their reciprocal activities and responses.
Myles Burnyeat considers the snub nose as a paradigm for “form in matter
definitions” especially in the Physics. This assumption leads him to the conclu-
sion that its application in Ζ 5 happens “without overt reference to its role as
paradigm for form in matter definitions in the Physics”.7 As we will see, there is
sufficient reason to doubt a hierarchical relation between standard use and its
deviations, and to contend the flexibility of school examples in the primary sense
of the term. Therefore, I argue that there is a connection between its use in Ζ 5
and its use in Ε 1 or the Physics and other pragmateiai8 in the sense of a dynamic
Myles Burnyeat, A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications, 2001; Michael We-
din, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2000; Mary Louise Gill. Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989, 36 (on abstraction theory); Kyle Fraser, Aristotle on the Separation of Spe-
cies-Form, in: Animus 4 1999 (online journal:www.swgc.mun.ca/animus/1999vol4/fraser4.htm)).
4Ph. II, 2, 194a1-11; Ph. II 2, 194a12-26.
5Rh. 1360a23-37.
6Pol. 1309b21-33
7Myles Burnyeat, A Map to Metaphysics Z, 26; cf. also Michail Peramatzis, Matter in Scientific
Definitions, 39.
8Cf. Michail Peramatzis, Logical Level, 28.
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transfer in which the philosophical practices change and are modified by and in
their particular contexts.9
In our case the dynamics of the snub nose do not end at the boundaries of
the Corpus Aristotelicum or at the walls of the Lykeion that marked the frontier
of the discussion space. For at least motivically, it leads back to the Platonic
Academy. Plato describes the snub nose as a characteristic property of Socrates,
and the similarity between Socrates and the young Theaitetus finds one of its
first and foremost (outer) reasons in Theaetetus being snub nosed. It is here,
where Plato reflects on the snub nose and uses it as a case to explain something,
that is epistemically crucial. This assumption is supported by the fact that the
character Theaetetus is one of the very important nodes, as it were, in the Corpus
Platonicum which is entangled to a very high degree with several other central
passages and argumentations, including the Meno, the Charmides, the Sophistes,
the Republic etc.10 Theaetetus even becomes an example already in the Platonic
Corpus, namely in the Sophistes, and functions in his relationship to Socrates as
paradigmatic object of Socrates’ maieutic method.
But, what happens when Aristotle pursues the core and potential of these
Platonic practices on other terms? In this paper I explore multiple forms of refe-
rence to Plato and thereby extend the concept of intertextuality beyond instan-
ces of quotation and directly intended report or reference by also including oral
practices and the dynamic interaction between oral lectures and written treati-
ses. There is not only the verbal quotation of a passage and the explicit naming
of a certain dialogue or dialogue passage, but also the re-writing of a motive,
the re-functionalizing of a metaphor, the re-shaping of an image, the re-use and
transfer of an example into another context, and the dynamics between the oral
and written usage of the example.
These new extended concepts of reference will contribute to broadening our
understanding of Aristotle’s communicative practices towards and with Plato and
the Platonic Academy and also of the genesis and dynamics of Aristotelian trea-
tises and the intratextual interactions inside the Corpus. The entanglements bet-
ween the different instances of the examples inside the Corpus Aristotelicum and
the communication with Platonic texts and teaching institutions via these ex-
9Frank A. Lewis, A Nose by Any Other Name: Sameness, Substitution, and Essence in Metaphy-
sics Z 5, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28, 2005, 161-91 underlines the connection
between the snub nose in Z 5 and the Sophistici Elenchi.
10For the sources cf. Debra Nails, The People of Plato, Indianapolis 2002, 275; Thomas Alexander
Szlezák: Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platons späten Dialogen, Berlin 2004, 103–109; Jill Gordon:
Plato’s Erotic World, Cambridge 2012, 125–130, Anne Balansard: Enquête sur la doxographie pla-
tonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète, Sankt Augustin 2012, 32–38; Eugenio Benitez,
Livia Guimaraes: Philosophy as Performed in Plato’s Theaetetus, in: The Review of Metaphysics
47, 1993/1994, 297–328.
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amples hint at a scholarly use of Platonic references or to phrase it differently:
they hint at knowledge arranged and applied in the context of school institutional
practices which is constitutive for Aristotle’s philosophical communication.
We will thus gain insights into whether or how there was a school tradition
that crosses the boundaries of the distinct school institutions of the Academy
and the Lykeion and possible audiences and readerships of the particular texts.
Such a tradition of scholarly practices involves many protagonists and networks,
and arranges and rearranges or contextualizes and re-contextualizes knowledge.
That means: I will discuss school examples as scholarly practices that contribute
to a dynamic ordering and re-ordering of material which is better referred to as
contextualizing and re-contextualizing because of the active and creative input
that is involved in this process.11
2 The Snub Nose as School Practice
In the case of the snub nose – which will be used as a paradigm – there are two
main circles of example practices which intersect with each other: one which is
connected with the distinction between the horizons and specific tasks of Phy-
sics and Metaphysics, while the other refers to elenctic strategies against sophi-
stic argumentational fraud. However, inside these circles, each context requires
different arguments and shapes of the example, and each context produces and
involves intersecting aspects and arguments across the two circles.
Because of its explicitness and elaborateness the instance of the snub-no-
se-example inMetaphysics Ζ 512 can function as a starting point for our project:
If someone denies that a logos which is built out of an addition can be a definition,
it is a problem to be resolved, of which of the not simple but compound things
there will be a definition. For it is necessary to explain them out of an addition.
E.g. there is nose and concavity, and snubness, which is said out of the two in the
form of the ‘this in that’, and neither concavity nor snubness are accidentally af-
fections of the nose, but by itself (kath’auten). Nor is ‘white’ attached to ‘Kallias’,
or to ‘man’ (because Kallias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as ‘male’ atta-
ches to ‘animal’ and ‘equal’ to ‘quantity’ and as all per se attributes attach to their
subjects.
11By using the terms ‘new contextualization’ or ‘re-contextualization’ and ‘transfer’ I refer to
the terminological instruments which have been developed in the Collaborative Research Center
“Episteme in motion” (CRC 980) at the Freie Universität Berlin. The CRC 980 has supported this
paper by a financial aid for proof reading.
12Frank A. Lewis (2005). A Nose by Any Other Name: Sameness, Substitution, and Essence in
Metaphysics Z 5. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28, 161-91.
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Such attributes are those in which either the logos or the name to which this af-
fection attaches inhere, and which cannot be explained without, e.g. ‘white’ can
be explained without ‘man’, but not ‘female’ without ‘animal’. Therefore, there is
either no what-it-is-to-be (i.e. the substantial being, ti ên einai) and definition of
any of these things, or if there is, it is in another sense, as we have said. There is
just another problem about them. For if ‘snub nose’ is the same as ‘concave nose’,
‘snub’ and ‘concave’ would be the same. But if not (because it is impossible to pre-
dicate ‘snub’ without the subject of which it is an affection for itself (kath’auto),
for it is ‘concavity in a nose’), either one cannot say ‘snub nose’ or there is no other
way than to say the same twice: ‘nose nose concave’ (for ‘snub nose’ will be ‘con-
cave nose nose’). Therefore, it is absurd <to assume> that these things have an
essential form (ti ên einai); but if not, there will be an infinite regress: for, in ‘snub
nose nose’ another thing will be involved. Therefore, there is only a definition of
the substance (ousia). (Metaph. Ζ 5, 1030b14-1031a2)13
In dealing with the snub nose case Aristotle pursues an argumentational com-
plex which he presented and started in the preceding chapter Ζ 4.14 This chapter
was concerned with the question whether there is a way in which objects can
be defined that are not like the first substances self-contained and independent-
ly existing but in some way connected and mixed with something else. In Ζ 4
Aristotle has led multiple approaches and objections to an answer which neit-
her denies nor affirms the possibility of definitions of non-substances. Instead
he presented a solution as acceptable that allows for a secondary sense of defi-
nables. In some way it seems plausible to give a formula (logos), an account on
things that are compounds, which can substitute a definition in the first sense or
at least come near such a function.
13 ῎Εχει δ’ ἀpiορίαν, ἐάν τις µὴ φῇ ὁρισµὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐκ piροσθέσεως λόγον, τίνος ἔσται ὁρισµὸς
τῶν οὐχ ἁpiλῶν ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασµένων ἐκ piροσθέσεως γὰρ ἀνάγκη δηλοῦν. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι ῥὶς
καὶ κοιλότης, καὶ σιµότης τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν λεγόµενον τῷ τόδε ἐν τῷδε, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συµβεβηκός
γε οὔθ’ ἡ κοιλότης οὔθ’ ἡ σιµότης piάθος τῆς ῥινός, ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὑτήν οὐδ’ ὡς τὸ λευκὸν Καλλίᾳ, ἢ
ἀνθρώpiῳ, ὅτι Καλλίας λευκὸς ᾧ συµβέβηκεν ἀνθρώpiῳ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ ἄρρεν τῷ ζῴῳ καὶ τὸ ἴσον
τῷ piοσῷ καὶ piάντα ὅσα λέγεται καθ’ αὑτὰ ὑpiάρχειν.ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν ὅσοις ὑpiάρχει ἢ ὁ λόγος
ἢ τοὔνοµα οὗ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ piάθος, καὶ µὴ ἐνδέχεται δηλῶσαι χωρίς, ὥσpiερ τὸ λευκὸν ἄνευ τοῦ
ἀνθρώpiου ἐνδέχεται ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ζῴου ὥστε τούτων τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁρισµὸς ἢ
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενὸς ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἄλλως, καθάpiερ εἰρήκα- µεν. ἔστι δὲ ἀpiορία καὶ ἑτέρα piερὶ αὐτῶν.
εἰ µὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι σιµὴ ῥὶς καὶ κοίλη ῥίς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται τὸ σιµὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον εἰ δὲ µή, διὰ
τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰpiεῖν τὸ σιµὸν ἄνευ τοῦ piράγµατος οὗ ἐστὶ piάθος καθ’ αὑτό (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σι-
µὸν κοιλότης ἐν ῥινί), τὸ ῥῖνα σιµὴν εἰpiεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται εἰρηµένον, ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη
(ἡ γὰρ ῥὶς ἡ σιµὴ ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη ἔσται), διὸ ἄτοpiον τὸ ὑpiάρχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι εἰ δὲ
µή, εἰς ἄpiειρον εἶσιν ῥινὶ γὰρ ῥινὶ σιµῇ ἔτι ἄλλο ἐνέσται. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι µόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν
ὁ ὁρισµός.
14See my full interpretation and contextualization of Ζ 4: G. Uhlmann, Metaphysics Ζ 4: Ari-
stotle’s Arguments and his Audiences – Preliminary Studies on Audience-Driven Dynamics in
Aristotle, in: Working Papers des SFB Episteme in Bewegung, Working Paper No. 9, 2017.
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The whole issue does not have an end only in itself but serves as a means to
better understand what it is for the first substances to be a being in a primary
sense:15 what is the sufficient reason for their being something which is in the
strong sense of the term.16
In order to clarify things in and around this complex of questions, Aristot-
le addresses a property of first substances that is likely to prepare for such
an answer, i.e. the what-it-is-to-be (ti ên einai), and a criterion which leads to a
what-it-is-to-be-something, i.e. to be something ‘in respect of itself’ (kath’auto).
In Ζ 5 the snub nose case is considered in terms of predicational logic and
in terms of ontology with respect to preparing definitions in the primary sense
of the term. Snubness is the way in which noses are concave. That means, it is a
certain quality on a certain given or fixed substratum, namely an affection of the
(human) nose. Aristotle describes this close relation between ‘snub’ and ‘nose’
by saying that it belongs ‘in respect of itself’ (kath’auten) to snubness to be an
affection of the nose.
However, ‘in respect of itself’ (kath’auto) is a term with multiple meanings
or to put it more precisely: a term that can be used differentlly in Aristotle’s
discussions and lectures.17 Therefore, Aristotle felt the necessity or was asked
by his students and fellow debaters – we always have to bear both options in
mind –, to define the concrete meaning in the context of Ζ 4 more precisely and
responds to this task by distinguishing between several different meanings of ‘in
respect of itself’ (kath’auto).18
For the snub nose the ‘by itself-relation’ becomes clear in contrast to the rela-
tion between ‘white’ and ‘Kallias’ or between ‘white’ and ‘man’. ‘White’ has no ne-
cessary connection and relation to ‘Kallias’ or, put predicationally, what-it-is-to-
be-white can be said and defined without ‘Kallias’ or ‘man’.19 This is not the case
15Ζ 1, 1028a13-15; 1028a25-27; 1028a29-33; 1028b2-7.
16Cf. Frank A. Lewis, Substance and Predication in Aristotle, Cambridge 1991, 158ff.
17One major passage of reference is the argumentation in Posterior Analytics I,4: 73a34-73b5.
18Ζ 4, 1029b14-18, cf. Uhlmann 2017a (Metaphysics Ζ 4: Aristotle’s Arguments and his Au-
diences).
19It is interesting to consider the discussion between Frede/Patzig and the authors of “Notes on
Ζ” about 1030b20-21 (Frede/Patzig, II, 81; Burnyeat et alii, 30) and the question, for what does the
causal clause give a reason? The authors of “Notes on Ζ” think it provides a reason why ‘white’
is accidental to ‘Kallias’. Frede/Patzig argue that it gives the reason why ‘white’ is accidental in
relation to ‘man’, which makes perfect makes sense considering that it explains the indirect rela-
tion between ‘white’ and ‘man’. However, Frede/Patzig remark that the difficulty arises because
of a sloppy way of expressing the relationship between ‘white’ and ‘Kallias’, for the text gives
“because Kallias is white (masculinum!), to whom ‘man’ belongs accidentally”, insinuating that ‘to
whom’ refers to ‘Kallias’. But this seems to be not compatible with many other instances where
Aristotle assigns genos-qualifications to species or individuals. It is, however, much more likely
and appropriate to take ‘to whom’ as referring to ‘white’. It is possible in Greek to express this
in the way Aristotle has built the sentence, it is just not as smoothly understandable as the al-
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with ‘snub’: ‘snub’ cannot be said without reference to ‘nose’, i.e. it has a neces-
sary relation to ‘nose’.
At this point Aristotle provides a comparison that is surprising at first sight:
he states that ‘snub’ in relation to ‘nose’ is similar to the predicate ‘male’ in
relation to ‘animal’ or the predicate ‘equal’ to ‘quantity’.20 The explanation for
this comparison is that they are both ‘in respect of itself’ (kath’auta) predicates,
defined as follows:
“And such attributes are those in which either the formula (logos) or the name
to which this affection attaches inhere, and which cannot be explained without.”
(Metaph. 1030b23-25)21
This means that the comparison contributes directly to the overarching task of
distinguishing between different forms of things which are in some way composi-
tes. There are composites where there is no conceptual connection, like in ‘white’
and ‘Kallias’ and others, where to understand and define something requires
the reference to something different, like in ‘male’ and ‘animal’ (ὥσpiερ τὸ λευκὸν
ἄνευ τοῦ ἀνθρώpiου ἐνδέχεται ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ζῴου (1030b25-26)), since
‘male’ or ‘female’ cannot be defined without ‘animal’ (and: you cannot know what
‘male’ or ‘female’ means without knowing what ‘animal’ is). Therefore, ‘snub’ is
an example for something which requires in its definition the formula (logos) of
the substratum of which it is an affection (as a ‘this in that’ (τόδε ἐν τῷδε)).
Aristotle thus draws the conclusion that in every similar case such a compo-
site (syndedyasmenon) has no what-it-is-to-be (ti ên einai) and cannot be defined
self-for-itself (auto kath’auto) (1036b26-28).22
ternative expression. This discussion is relevant for our perspective since it works as an example
for this discussion practices performed in schools and oral contexts where it is (1) easily possi-
ble to make sure of the intended meaning and where (2) the discussion partners are acquainted
with certain basic and recurring ways of expressions and questions. If we start from the hypo-
thesis that Aristotle’s intended audience in Metaphysics Ζ is such an audience, then problems in
correlating certain terms in a sentence to each other almost vanish.
20Frede/Patzig criticize Aristotle ad locum (Frede/Patzig, II, 80f.) by stating that Aristotle was
misled by a linguistic peculiarity; for ‘snub’ (in German: ‘stubsnasig’ which contains the substra-
tum, or the made-up word ‘stupsig’), Frede/Patzig argue, is nothing else than a particular kind of
being concave and can be realized elsewhere and not only in noses, whereas Aristotle treats it as
if it were exclusively bound to noses. However, this is exactly, what Aristotle claims: ‘snub’ is the
special way to be concave as concavity is realized in noses, whereas in other matters concavity
is called otherwise. It is an ontological argument: there are properties that are distinguished by
the matter in which they are received: these matter change the property in such a way that it is
adequate to call these properties by a special name, which indicates a certain kind of being.
21ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν ὅσοις ὑpiάρχει ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνοµα οὗ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ piάθος, καὶ µὴ ἐνδέχεται
δηλῶσαι χωρίς..
22ὥστε τούτων τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁρισµὸς ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενὸς ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἄλλως, καθάpiερ
εἰρήκαµεν.
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Michael Wedin23 has suggested for this kind of non-accidental predication the
term ‘per se2-attribution’, in order to underline that such terms are not substan-
tially predicated in the primary sense, i.e. predicates that belong substantially to
the substratum, of which they are predicated. The term is also useful for presen-
ting the different approaches that Aristotle tests, one after the other, towards
his research question. For, he is heading for an answer to the question regarding
the sufficient reason for the first substances, the tode ti, to be ontologically prior.
To do so, he first and foremost needs to identify something that can be defined
self-for-itself, and which owns this predicate by itself.
This will be the topic of Ζ 10 and 11 and is not touched directly in Ζ 4 and
5,24 but these chapters provide preliminary studies and warm-ups,25 as it were,
which try out paths to distinguish between multiple ways of something that can
be defined without reference to something else (like in the case of the ‘this in that’
(τόδε ἐν τῷδε). The self-sufficiency in regard to determinability and definability
is thus pivotal in Ζ 4 and 5.
This is the underlying driving force for research where the first part of the
snub case in Ζ 5 intersects with other instances in Metaphysics Ε, but also with
the Physics and the De anima, notwithstanding the fact that these instances serve
different tasks and fit different contexts.
2.1 Snub Nose and Deviation
Before I discuss these cases we must deal with two passages in which snub noses
are used in a similar way on a rather simple level of argument: As in Politics V, 9
(1309b23-29)26 Aristotle in Rhetoric I, 4 (1360a27-29) uses the example of a snub
nose and of a hooked nose in order to explain how something can deviate from
being good or ideal. Although a snub nose deviates from the ideal straightness of
a nose, he argues in the Politics that it is still recognizable as a nose and as some-
thing beautiful. And it is not before the deviation once again becomes stronger
that the snub nose is no longer considered as being a nose. In the Rhetoric Ari-
stotle argues very similarly but shorter, and only hints as the excesses that would
lead to a dissolution of the being-a-nose or even something at all that functions
as a nose.
The passage in the Rhetoric deals with the laws as part of the political topics.
23Wedin, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2000, 63, 67-70, on Ζ 5: 247-257
24There is indeed a close relationship between Ζ 5 and 10, as Burnyeat has pointed out: Map,
38.
25Frede/Patzig, II, 54; Myles Burnyeat, A Map, 23-24; on the connection between Ζ 4 and 5 cf.
Michael Wedin, 2000, 247-257.
26Pol. 1309b22-31.
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It does so in the frame of the exposition of how to give a deliberative speech. Ari-
stotle argues that the rhetorician does not need to have knowledge in the primary
sense of the subjects he is dealing with,27 but underlines that it is important for
the rhetorician to know which kind of laws are beneficial for which kind of go-
vernment and where and which kind of excesses can be detrimental for a state.
Since in Politics V, 9 Aristotle discusses in a similar way which kind of laws are
beneficial and how and which kind of excesses can destroy a state, it is likely that
the two passages or the two discussion contexts are correlated with each other.28
Because of the fact that the topic primarily belongs to political science and be-
cause of the elaborateness of the passage29 it seems to be more likely that the
passage in the Rhetoric refers to the Politics, or rather: to a discussion conducted
by Aristotle in the framework of his political discourses.
With regard to the use of the snub nose in Metaphysics Ζ 5 and other rela-
ted passages the two texts present rather simple cases in which the necessary
connection of ‘snub’ with ‘nose’ is only implicitly present. However, it is present
because Aristotle emphasizes that the nose is recognized as being snub as long
as the deviation from the straightness does not destroy the recognizability as a
nose (and as something beautiful). ‘Snub’ is, thus, a specific property of a nose
which ceases to exist together with its substratum. We have therefore in the two
passages from practical philosophy a usage which – in a simple way – touches
upon the entanglement between snub and nose, or between form and substratum
by reflecting on cases of excessive assumption of the shape of snubness and its
aftermath for the substratum. It is this entanglement which becomes crucial in
theMetaphysics, and Physics (among others) and is discussed there as a paradigm
for the ontological structure of singular beings in general.
2.2 Physics, Mathematics, and the Snubness
InMetaphysics Ε 1 Aristotle introduces the snub-nose-example as something that
is not a special case with a limited spectrum of applications. On the contrary, Ari-
stotle says that every object of the physicist’s perspective is just like the snub no-
se, and it becomes clear that in this argument the crucial point is the definability,
27Christof Rapp, Aristoteles: Rhetorik, übersetzt und erläutert von Christof Rapp, Berlin, 2002,
310-320.
28I am grateful to Christian Vogel for discussing the role of the two examples from practical
philosophy in the wider context of the school practices with me.
29Eckart Schütrumpf, Aristoteles: Politik. Band 9 der Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, übersetzt
und erläutert von Eckart Schütrumpf, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, Buch IV–VI (Band 9.3, zusammen
mit Hans-Joachim Gehrke, 1996), ad loc. 536-538; cf. also id., Platonic Methodology in the program
of Aristotle’s political philosophy. Politics IV 1, in: Transactions of the Amer. Philol. Assoc., 119,
1989, 209-220.
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the reason of which lies in the indetachability of being snub from its substratum
‘nose’.
“Here, we must not forget how the essential being and the logos are, for without
them it is useless to inquire. Of things that can be defined and belong to the
what-it-is, some are like the snub, some like the concave. These things differ, be-
cause the snub is bound together with matter (for ‘snub’ is ‘concave nose’), while
concavity is without sensible matter. If all natural things are predicated like the
snub, e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general animal, leaf, root, bough,
bark, and in general plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to
motion), but has always matter, it is clear how we have to seek and define the
‘what’ in the physical objects; and therefore it is also the work of the physicist to
contemplate on the psyche/soul, so far as it is independent of matter.” (Metaph. Ε
1, 1025b28-1026a6)30
In defining physical entities we always face the same problem as in the case of
the snubness: they are not definable without their substratum, i.e. that in which
they are as a ‘this in that’ (τόδε ἐν τῷδε), and that, of which they are predicated
as a ‘this of that’ (ti kata tinos).31
The snub, Aristotle explains, is just like every physical entity like eye, face,
leaf, plant etc. It is as a property necessarily bound to a substratum (a matter)
and therefore to be considered just like a compound in terms of definability. In
each case, the logos or definition is not without motion (or: without matter (ὅση
µὴ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν (1026a6)), and that means that the definition is bound
to a particular matter that is different from the definiendum and is therefore
responsible for a lesser degree of unity of the defining logos.
This serves as an explanation for the wide distribution of the example, since
it gives valuable clues for ontological analyses and predicational handlings of the
tode ti, the first substance, the proper understanding of which is one major or
the major concern in Aristotle teaching First philosophy. This major question is
elaborated in a context-dependent way.
30δεῖ δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον piῶς ἐστὶ µὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς ἄνευ γε τούτου τὸ ζητεῖν µηδέν
ἐστι piοιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὁριζοµένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ µὲν ὡς τὸ σιµὸν τὰ δ’ ὡς τὸ κοῖ- λον.
διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ µὲν σιµὸν συνειληµµένον ἐστὶ µετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιµὸν κοίλη
ῥίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλό- της ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς. εἰ δὴ piάντα τὰ φυσικὰ ὁµοίως τῷ σιµῷ λέγονται, οἷον
ῥὶς ὀφθαλµὸς piρόσωpiον σὰρξ ὀστοῦν, ὅλως ζῷον, φύλλον ῥίζα φλοιός, ὅλως φυτόν (οὐθενὸς
γὰρ ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἔχει ὕλην), δῆλον piῶς δεῖ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ τί ἐστι
ζητεῖν καὶ ὁρίζε- σθαι, καὶ διότι καὶ piερὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας θεωρῆσαι τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ὅση µὴ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης
ἐστίν.
31On the difference between the definability of compounds and attributes/properties like snub-
ness cf. David Bostock, Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H. Oxford 1994, ad loc., and Michael
Wedin, 2000, 247f.
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In Metaphysics Ε 1 Aristotle distinguishes between three basic objects of
knowledge which are considered by three different and basic disciplines: namely
Physics, Mathematics, and First philosophy. Since it is the task of the outline in
Metaphysics Ε to locate First philosophy in the context of other sciences, Ari-
stotle presents a rough distinction the function of which is to give a first and
general clue to the relations and entanglements between the basic branches of
knowledge. What we learn about snubness is that it is something that is bound
to matter.
In the Physics this focus is repeated, but put more concretely.32 Again, Ari-
stotle discusses questions about the definability of – in this case – physical en-
tities. He critizes those who speak of forms because they are not aware of the
methodological impact of their handling of physical beings and the fact that the
matter-aspect in physical substances is in a physical analysis not or less sepa-
rable and therefore, has to be included or at least considered in the defining
endeavour. (In any case, we should not understand the relation between the two
instances of repetition in a fixed chronological sense, since Metaphysics Ε refers
to a discussion which can be found in the Physics as we have it today. This relati-
on cannot be used as an argument for an earlier or later date of origin for either
of the texts. It is more probable to assume that the text from First philosophy re-
fers to an argument from considerations in physics, not necessarily to a version
which later was included in the lectures on physics.)
In this context Aristotle mentions the snub case only en passant and ellip-
tically:
“these are defined like ‘snub nose’ not like ‘bent”’ (Ph. 194a6-7)33
‘These’ (ταῦτα) refers to the physical objects which have their being “not without
motion”. The difference between ‘snub’ and ‘bent’ is not elaborated, but as in Me-
taphysics Ε 1, presupposed. Aristotle has the full explanation elsewhere (namely
in Metaphysics Ζ 5 and Ζ 11). This observation does not mean that these other in-
stances have to be presupposed as the texts as we have them now but that there
was an ongoing discussion about and with this example and the ontological and
predicational difference between ‘snub’ and ‘bent’ in the teaching and research
contexts that was conducted by Aristotle or to which Aristotle contributed.
What is focussed here becomes even clearer in the sequel of this text:
“Since ‘nature’ has two senses, the form and the matter, we must investigate its
objects as we would the essence of snubness. That is, such things are neither in-
dependent of matter nor can be defined in terms of matter only. Here too indeed
32Ph. II, 2, 194a1-11, Ph. II, 2, 194a12-26, Ph. I, 3, 186b14-26.
33ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσpiερ ῥὶς σιµὴ ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τὸ καµpiύλον λέγεται.
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one might raise a difficulty. Since there are two natures, with which is the physi-
cist concerned? Or should he investigate the combination of the two? But if the
combination of the two, then also each severally. Does it belong then to the same
or to different sciences to know each severally?
If we look at the ancients, physics would to be concerned with the matter. (It was
only very slightly that Empedocles and Democritus touched on the forms and the
essence.) But if on the other hand art imitates nature, and it is the part of the sa-
me discipline to know the form and the matter up to a point (e.g. the doctor has
a knowledge of health and also of bile and phlegm, in which health is realized,
and the builder both of the form of the house and of the matter, namely that it is
bricks and beams, and so forth): if this is so, it would be the part of physics also
to know nature in both its senses.” (Ph. II 2,194a12-26, Transl. by R.P. Hardie and
R.K. Gaye))34
Instead of distinguishing between considering objects with or without matter
like in Metaphysics Ε 1, Aristotle introduces a second distinction which builds on
the differentiation of two meanings of ‘physis’, one according to the form aspect
and the other according to the matter aspect – a differentiation that has been
just delivered in Physics II, 1. Aristotle states that in physics physical objects
are considered with motion or with matter but not according to matter. In some
sense qualities of the matter are to be taken into account in physical theory. The
concept of four causes to which Aristotle refers to in the following argument
suggests that matter will be part of the physical practices as a necessary cause
but not as a sufficient definiens.
Aristotle, thus, entangles the application of the matter-form distinction on
different meanings of the term ‘physis’ and uses the snub as an example for
the further distinction between different theoretical practices and approaches to
things that are (like the tode ti) enmattered entities. The focus thereby changes
slightly compared to the usage in Metaphysics Ε 1 and Ζ 5, without losing the
immediate connection to other instances. This dynamic ordering and re-ordering
of material can be explained as contextualizing and re-contextualizing of concep-
tual and disputational elements and material.
An important part of these dynamics is the option to elliptically refer to other
34ἐpiεὶ δ’ ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὡς ἂν εἰ piερὶ σιµότητος σκοpiοῖµεν τί ἐστιν,
οὕτω θεωρητέον ὥστ’ οὔτ’ ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ piερὶ τούτου
ἀpiορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἐpiεὶ δύο αἱ φύσεις, piερὶ piοτέρας τοῦ φυσικοῦ. ἢ piερὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀµφοῖν· ἀλλ’ εἰ piερὶ
τοῦ ἐξ ἀµφοῖν, καὶ piερὶ ἑκατέρας. piότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης ἑκατέραν γνωρίζειν· εἰς µὲν γὰρ
τοὺς ἀρχαίους ἀpiοβλέψαντι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τῆς ὕλης (ἐpiὶ µικρὸν γάρ τι µέρος ᾿Εµpiεδοκλῆς καὶ
∆ηµόκριτος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἥψαντο) εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη µιµεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς
ἐpiιστήµης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην µέχρι του (οἷον ἰατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγµα, ἐν
οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόµου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι piλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀµφοτέρας τὰς φύσεις.
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instances without being forced to fix a (static) standard form of the example. We
can observe such cases also in de an. III, 4. Here, the snub example is applied in
order to explain the difference between things the what-it-is-to-be(-something) of
which (the to ti ên einai) is identical with the object itself which is to be defined.
“Since ‘magnitude’ is different from what-it-is-to-be-a-magnitude, and ‘water’ from
what-it-is-to-be-water (and equally with many other things, but not with all: with
some it is the same), what-it-is-to-be-flesh and ‘flesh’ are distinguished either by
different <faculties> or by the same, that is in another state. For, ‘flesh’ is not
without matter, but, like ‘snub’, a ‘this in that’.” (de an. 429b10-14)35
Aristotle introduces the distinction between things of which the what-it-is-to-be
(ti ên einai) is identical with the actual being of the thing, and things where this is
not the case. This serves as an introduction and preparation for the definition of
the intellect as something which is in every regard separate from matter and has
in no way an enmattered existence (de an. III,4,429b21-22). The elliptic reference
to the snub example comprises two aspects: ‘snub’ (1) implies a material (and
potentially sensible) substratum, and (2) cannot be defined in the first sense of
the term but only by including the reference to something that is different from
the definiendum. This, so to speak, short cut cannot be wholly understood or
applied without the context of a school or institution where it has been discussed
and coined for certain usages or certain kinds of usage.
This instance leads us directly back to the circles of discussion inMetaphysics
Z, namely to Ζ 10-11, where Aristotle continues his approaches and re-approa-
ches from Ζ 4-5 by discussing explicitly which aspects and parts of a substance
can be accepted to be proper parts of a definition (in a first or secondary sense).
The snub case in the dynamic shape, that we have just reconstructed, can ob-
tain pivotal functions in this approach, since it represents objects the definition
of which needs to include – in a certain sense and to a certain degree – aspects of
the matter part of the compound (Ζ 10, 1035a1-6).
“If, then, matter is one thing, form another, the compound of these a third, and
matter, form and the compound out of these are ‘substance’, even the matter is
said to be in some sense part of something, in some sense not, but only that out
of which the logos of the form consists. E.g. of concavity flesh is not a part (for it
is the matter in which it is generated), of snubness it is a part; and the bronce is a
part of the whole statue, but not of the statue when it is said in the sense of the
form (for the form and insofar as each thing has a form, should be said (sc. to be
35ἐpiεὶ δ’ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ µέγεθος καὶ τὸ µεγέθει εἶναι, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ’
ἑτέρων piολλῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐpiὶ piάντων ἐpi’ ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλῳ
ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ’ ὥσpiερ τὸ σιµόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε.
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the thing), but the material part should never by itself be said so).”(Metaph. Ζ 10,
1035a1-9)36
The perspective in Ζ 10 has changed in comparison to Ζ 5. Aristotle considers
the definability of beings in another approach: Since a definition is a logos, i.e. a
speech which connects something with something else, it necessarily has parts.
Therefore, in order to answer the question of whether something can be defined,
one first has to ask (1) whether the object that is to be defined has parts and
aspects that are inseparable and must be included in a definition and (2) whether
these are parts of one single unit or infer different things/elements that belong
to something different. For, only in cases like the intellect (cf. de an. III,4) where
the ti ên einai is identical with the being of the object, will parts of the definition
be identical with the parts of the definiendum.
In this wider context Aristotle answers the need for clarification of diffe-
rent relations between parts and whole and plurality of parts and oneness of
the whole.
The whole complex is approached in two attempts. At the end of the first Ari-
stotle notes that the questions have been led to a sufficient answer. Still, Aristotle
says, it should be approached just one more time in order to gain more concrete
results.
“The truth has been said, indeed, but still let us say more distinctly, taking up the
question again...” (Metaph. Ζ 10, 1035b3-4)37
The issue is another instance of Aristotle’s practice of contextualization and re-
contextualization in his philosophical practices. In its wording, however, it is
remarkable because Aristotle uses the expression “ἐpiαναλαβόντες” only in this
single case, this also holds true for the simpler verb “ἀναλαµβάνειν” (to take up):
in the Corpus Aristotelicum it is not used for methodological purposes, i.e. to re-
flect on Aristotle’s argumentational practice.
This leads to the assumption that Aristotle uses it as a reference to one or
multiple other texts in the Corpus Aristotelicum or to a different author: If we look
for such a point of reference in a similar and affiliated argumentational context
we are referred to a passage in Plato’s Theaetetus. In this dialogue Plato uses
the verb in the context of the discussion of Protagoras’ homo-mensura-sentence.
36εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ µὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δ’ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ
ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι µὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη µέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἴδους
λόγος. οἷον τῆς µὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι µέρος ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ’ ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ
σιµότητος µέρος καὶ τοῦ µὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος µέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δ’ ὡς εἴδους λεγοµένου
ἀνδριάντος οὔ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δ’ ὑλικὸν οὐδέpiοτε καθ’ αὑτὸ
λεκτέον)
37εἴρηται µὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν τὸ ἀληθές, ὅµως δ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον εἴpiωµεν ἐpiαναλαβόντες.
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Socrates here discusses why it is important to criticize for a second time the
sentence and concept of the sophist.
“If he himself were present and agreed on this, instead of us making the concession
and helping him out, there would be no need of taking up the question again and
reinforcoinge <sc. the argument>. But, as it is now, perhaps someone might say
that we do not have the authority to make the consensus in his place; therefore,
it is better to make the consensus even more distinct; for it makes a great deal of
difference whether it is so or elsewise.” (Tht. 169d10-e5)38
As in Ζ 10 the issue under discussion is already clear at that point, however, the
circumstances of the dialectical examination and a slight shift in perspective call
for another turn.
There is no need (albeit the possibility) to connect the two particular pas-
sages.39 What I am claiming, though, is that Aristotle, by using this expression,
invokes and takes up on discussion practices in the Platonic Academy as they are
mirrored and shaped in and through the Platonic dialogues. It comes as a side
effect and additional benefit that the whole snub case is particularly connected
and multiply entangled with the Platonic Theaetetus, and that our methodological
link leads from the discussion on knowledge in the Theaetetus to the discussion
on the definability of beings that are the objects of first philosophy. More im-
portant however are the links between the Platonic Corpus and the Aristotelian
Corpus.
Ζ 10, then, continues with the second approach and highlights different per-
spectives of the relationship between parts and whole in a definition. By doing
so Aristotle prepares for the basic assumption that only parts of the form (ei-
dos) can be properly included in the definitory practices (1035b33-1036a6).41 In
this context Aristotle again recalls the distinction which we already considered
in De anima III,4 between things whose substantial being is identical with their
existence as this or that object, and those for which this is not the case. The
latter case comprises all things that are compounds where substantial qualifi-
cations of the thing under consideration and qualities of something else are put
38Εἰ µὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς piαρὼν ὡµολόγει ἀλλὰ µὴ ἡµεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑpiὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαµεν,
οὐδὲν ἂν piάλιν ἔδει ἐpiαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι νῦν δὲ τάχ’ ἄν τις ἡµᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑpiὲρ
ἐκείνου ὁµολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον piερὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διοµολογήσασθαι οὐ γάρ
τι σµικρὸν piαραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.
39There are other entangled passages: i.e. in the Phaedo, where after the sufficient proof for the
immortality of the rational part of the soul has been elaborated and finished by the introduction
of the theory of forms, Echecrates, i.e. one of the dialogue partners of the framework story, inter-
venes in Phaedo’s narration and explicitly states his agreement with the results (Phd. 102a2-9).
After this Socrates introduces a “more select (kompsotera)” consideration of the question (Phd.
105c2)40, i.e. a more precise approach to the conceptual relations between soul and life.
41W.D. Ross emphasizes the relatedness of the two research questions in Z 10: 196.
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together. However, the former is what interests Aristotle in this context: no single
instance that is a compound of sensible matter and form, can fulfill this criteri-
on, since it cannot – like the snub nose – exist without a (different) substratum;
but only mathematical objects and the soul (sc. that is only intelligible and not
sensible) can.
Aristotle in our context of Ζ 10 (in connection to the discussion circles in Ζ
4-5) is interested in these objects not for the sake of the contemplation about
intelligibles but because they are an object for scholarly purposes to present
a complicated issue in a more easily accessible form: In contrast to cases like
the snub nose or every single sensible object they allow the students to see the
substantial parts and parts of the definitions without prior abstracting matter
qualities that do not belong to the definiendum.
That these approaches are pivotal for the whole issue of book Ζ becomes
obvious in the continuation and repetition of the question in Ζ 11: Once mo-
re, Aristotle appeals to the snub nose for the simple reason that in the school
discussion in which Aristotle is engaged, together with his students and fellow
philosophers ‘snub’ has become something like a short formular for one crucial
quality of every tode ti, namely that they always imply qualities that are derived
from the matter aspect of a tode ti and are therefore to be excluded from the
definition.
“What the what-it-is-to-be is and how it is self-for-itself, has been said universally
about everything, and also why the logos of the what-it-is-to-be contains parts of
the definiendum, while others do not, and that in the logos of the substance the
matter parts will not be included, because they are not parts of that substance but
of the concrete compound; and of this there is in a sense a logos, and in a sense,
there is not; for there is no logos of it together with its matter (for this is indefinite),
but there is a logos of it with reference to its primary substance; e.g. in the case of
man the logos of the soul. For the substance is the inherent form, the compound of
which together with matter is called substance, e.g. concavity (out of which and of
the nose ‘snub nose’ and ‘snubness’ arise [for ‘nose’ occur twice in these] – in the
compound substance, such as ‘snub nose’ or ‘Kallias’, matter is also present; And
we have said that the what-it-is-to-be is and the singular thing are in some cases
the same, as in the case of the first substances, e.g. being bent/curvedness and
the substantial being of curvedness if it is primary. (By primary I mean that which
is not said through being as something in something and underlying as matter);
but things which are like matter or of wholes that include matter, not the same
as their substantial being, nor are accidental unities like that of ‘Socrates’ and
‘well-educated’: for these are the same only accidentally...” (Ζ 11, 1037a20-b7)42
42Τί µὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ piῶς αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτό, καθόλου piερὶ piαντὸς εἴρηται, καὶ διὰ
τί τῶν µὲν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἔχει τὰ µόρια τοῦ ὁριζοµένου τῶν δ’ οὔ, καὶ ὅτι ἐν µὲν τῷ
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Snubness is presented along with ‘Kallias’ as standard example for a single hu-
man being or a tode ti in general. ‘Snub nose’ is taken together with ‘Kallias’ to
represent the compound substance (synolon ousia). As in Metaphysics Ε 1 it is
thereby underlined that the example does not introduce a special case here, but
adds specifically to the general discussion circles in which book Ζ is involved. Our
passage adds concrete differentiations about the indefinability of the compound
substance as a whole, which consists out of form- and matter-aspects. Ζ 11 is
clear in that matter aspects cannot be ranked among the parts of the definiens
because of the indefiniteness of the thereby constructed definiendum (ἀόριστον
γάρ). Therefore, compound substances can and cannot be defined. They cannot
be defined in the way they exist.
Once more – corresponding to De anima III, 4 andMetaphysics Ζ 10 – Aristotle
refers to the distinction between things, of which the what-it-is-to-be (ti ên einai)
is identical with their being as substances and connects the snub nose with this
argumentational tool (1037a33-b2), which prepares for solutions to the question
of what has to be comprised in a proper or secondary definition.
As an intermediary result we can conclude that the snub case as a school
practice can be described as a circling form of argumentational practice which
does not consider or analyze a problem only from one perspective and in one
approach, but the issue is – so to speak – zeroed in by posing questions from
slightly different perspectives and by addressing different aspects of a problem,
allowing it to be defended against possible misunderstandings.
This kind of orbiting practice which intends to check out hidden flaws or
insufficient distinctions, is likely to reflect the argumentational practices in the
teaching and discussion contexts of the school institutions in which Aristotle de-
veloped his pragmateiai. It is also plausible that these practices were entangled
with the instruments and rules of such practices presented by Aristotle in his
Topics. Building on this connection we can assume that some of the argumenta-
tional waves and objections are issues that were introduced by students or other
participants in Aristotle’s research circles and lessons.43
τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ οὕτω µόρια ὡς ὕλη οὐκ ἐνέσται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκείνης µόρια τῆς οὐσίας
ἀλλὰ τῆς συνόλου, ταύτης δέ γ’ ἔστι piως λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν µετὰ µὲν γὰρ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἔστιν
(ἀόριστον γάρ), κατὰ τὴν piρώτην δ’ οὐσίαν ἔστιν, οἷον ἀνθρώpiου ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος ἡ γὰρ οὐσία
ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἡ σύνολος λέγεται οὐσία, οἷον ἡ κοιλότης (ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης
καὶ τῆς ῥινὸς σιµὴ ῥὶς καὶ ἡ σιµότης ἐστί [δὶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὑpiάρξει ἡ ῥίς])—ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόλῳ
οὐσίᾳ, οἷον ῥινὶ σιµῇ ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἐνέσται καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον ἐpiὶ τινῶν µὲν
ταὐτό, ὥσpiερ ἐpiὶ τῶν piρώτων οὐσιῶν, οἷον καµpiυλότης καὶ καµpiυλότητι εἶναι, εἰ piρώτη ἐστίν
(λέγω δὲ piρώτην ἣ µὴ λέγεται τῷ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι καὶ ὑpiοκειµένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ), ὅσα δὲ ὡς ὕλη ἢ
ὡς συνειληµµένα τῇ ὕλῃ, οὐ ταὐτό, οὐδ’ ἑἰ᾿ κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς ἕν, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ µουσικόν
ταῦτα γὰρ ταὐτὰ κατὰ συµβεβηκός.
43It is important to resist the temptation to imagine Aristotle as a modern or 19th century
university professor giving his lectures and seminars. Needless to say, there are numerous dif-
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This also includes the practice which structures the approach and analysis of
a problem by collecting and reaffirming the results that have been achieved and
upon which the discussing community has agreed; and the practice of cross-re-
ference to other disciplines and treatises.
For example, at the beginning of Ζ 12 Aristotle connects the following argu-
mentation on definitions and on different primary and secondary forms of defi-
nitions (which is the continuation of arguments in Ζ 4-5) in 10-11, with chapter
Β 10 in the Posterior Analytics.
“Now, we want to say what has not been said in the Analytics about definition.
For, the aporia that has been expressed there is fruitful for the arguments about
substance.” (Ζ 12, 1037b8-10)44
Therefore, the orbiting and transfering of argumentational instruments and di-
stinctions are not limited to the argumentation in one discipline or pragmateia,
but also have the potential to transgress disciplinary borders.45 This can be fur-
ther substantiated by the following instance and passage, namely the second part
of the snub case in Ζ 5.
2.3 The Snub Nose Nose
A sentence in Ζ 11, which is text-critically problematic, directs us back to the
second part of Ζ 5, which I have not yet discussed. The text part (or insertion)
runs as follows: Ζ 11, 1037a31-32:
ferences – starting with the difference between an institutionalized lecture format and (silently
or explicitly) accepted and applied rules and protocols in modern universities right up to the
differences in the social situation of the students and their relation to their teachers or the func-
tion and social status of the professors. However, this must not force the interpreter to totally
abstain from contextualizing Aristotle’s teaching and his students’ learning also in the historical
social and institutional contexts and perspectives. Although in most cases we are not able to
identify particular students and discussion partners, what we can do is resconstruct their edu-
cational and curricular history, their syllabus and their (presumable) expectations, interests and
questions which must have been articulated at least in some way. It is not anachronistic or an act
of illegitimate transfer across the centuries if we only presuppose that there must have been a
place, an institutional context (taken in a wide notion of ‘institution’), people who interact with
the intent to grasp on certain objects of knowledge, all of which placed Aristotle in the positi-
on to accomplish knowledge by way of asking questions and distinguishing between different
meanings and properties.
44Νῦν δὲ λέγωµεν piρῶτον ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς piερὶ ὁρισµοῦ µὴ εἴρηται ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις
ἀpiορία λεχθεῖσα piρὸ ἔργου τοῖς piερὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγοις.
45Another example for this is presented by Balme (D.M. Balme, The Snub, in: Ancient Philosophy
4, 1984, 1-8): de gen. an. 778a4-9 (βούλεται µὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθµοῖς ἀριθµεῖν τὰς
γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοῖ δὲ διά τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι
piολλὰς ἀρχὰς αἳ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθορὰς ἐµpiοδίζουσαι piολλάκις αἴ- τιαι τῶν
piαρὰ φύσιν συµpiιpiτόντων εἰσίν.) which refers to matter as a factor of indeterminacy.
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“Twice, then, in these the nose is extant.”46
The commentator Ross excluded it from his text and argued that it is irrelevant
here and assumed that the scribe might have thought of Ζ 5, 1030b32 and there-
fore amended the text in Ζ 11.
“but if snub and concave are not the same (because it is impossible to speak of
snubness apart from the thing of which it is an attribute propter se, for snubness
is concavity-in-a-nose), either it is impossible to say ‘snub nose’ or the same thing
will have been said twice, ‘concave nose nose’; for ‘snub nose’ will be ‘concave nose
nose’. And so it is absurd that such things should have an essence; if they have,
there will be an infinite regress; for in ‘snub nose nose’ yet another ‘nose’ will be
involved. Clearly, then, only substance is definable.” (Ζ 5, 1030b30-1031a2, transl.
by W.D. Ross)47
In order to judge by means of well-founded arguments it is necessary to – finally
– consider the second part of the snub case in Ζ 5, since it is there that Aristotle
introduces a second argumentational context and task that is different from the
first one, which has up to now been our primary concern in all instances.
It is by the very combination of two argumentational lines in Ζ 5 that the
snub-nose-example is fanned-out in different functions and contexts and embed-
ded into a network of similar argumentational series, this time into the logical
value and faultiness of conclusions and definitions.
2.4 Sophistici Elenchi as Repertoire for Argumentational Practi-
ces
The second part of the snub example refers to a sophistic fallacy which is descri-
bed and resolved in Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi. We can insist on the connection
between our metaphysical discussions and exercises in fallacies for the simple
reason that Aristotle mentions in Ζ 5 two problems which are also discussed and
solved in a chapter of our Sophistici Elenchi and solved.
“In the case of terms that are predicated of the terms through which they are
defined, you should say the same thing, that the term defined is not the same
in abstraction as it is in the whole phrase. For ‘concave’ has a general meaning
46δὶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὑpiάρξει ἡ ῥίς; I have marked this passage in its context above as problematic
by including it in square brackets.
47εἰ δὲ µή, διὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰpiεῖν τὸ σιµὸν ἄνευ τοῦ piράγµατος οὗ ἐστὶ piάθος καθ’ αὑτό
(ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιµὸν κοιλότης ἐν ῥινί), τὸ ῥῖνα σιµὴν εἰpiεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται εἰρηµένον,
ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη (ἡ γὰρ ῥὶς ἡ σιµὴ ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη ἔσται), διὸ ἄτοpiον τὸ ὑpiάρχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ τί
ἦν εἶναι εἰ δὲ µή, εἰς ἄpiειρον εἶσιν ῥινὶ γὰρ ῥινὶ σιµῇ ἔτι ἄλλο ἐνέσται. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι µόνης τῆς
οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισµός.
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which is the same in the case of a snub nose, and of a bandy leg, but when added
to either substantive nothing prevents it from differentiating its meaning; in fact
it bears one sense as applied to the nose, and another as applied to the leg: for
in the former connexion it means ‘snub’ and in the latter ‘bandyshaped’; i.e. it
makes no difference whether you say ‘a snub nose’ or ‘a concave nose’. Moreover,
the expression must not be granted in the nominative case: for it is a falsehood.
For snubness is not a concave nose but something (e.g. an affection) belonging to
a nose: hence, there is no absurdity in supposing that the snub nose is a “nose
possessing the concavity that belongs to a nose”. (SE 31, 181b35-182a6, translated
by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge)48
The first problem runs as follows: if ‘snub nose’ is the same as ‘concave nose’,
‘snub’ and ‘concave’ are the same, too. This can be resolved fairly easily by remin-
ding of the fact that a certain predicate can have different meanings if used in
different concrete contexts. That means that ‘concave’ has a different meaning in
the conjunction ‘concave nose’ in comparison to the conjunction ‘concave lens’.
This explanation refers to Aristotle’s rough description of ‘snub’ as ‘concavity of
a nose’ or ‘bow-leggedness’ as ‘concavity of the legs’.
The second problem arises if one equalizes ‘snub’ with ‘concave nose’, for it
follows that ‘snub nose’ means ‘concave nose nose’. Aristotle resolves the pro-
blem by clarifying that to equalize ‘snub’ and ‘concave nose’ is a sloppy way of
speaking, for ‘snub’ is not the same as ‘concave nose’ but signifies the property of
being concave which can only belong to a nose. Therefore, ‘snub nose’ is ‘a nose
which owns the concavity that can belong to a nose’.
Phil Corkum convincingly concludes from this intratextuality that Aristotle
presupposes for his Ζ 5 example an audience that is acquainted with the exerci-
ses in avoiding fallacies like that presented in the Sophistici Elenchi (as we have it
today).49 However, this must be further reflected and elaborated by asking: what
connects the logical problem in the Sophistici Elenchi and the predicational and
ontological question in theMetaphysics? Can we assume a connection at all?
This paper suggests as a hypothesis that it is characteristic for scholarly prac-
tices and excercises to undertake multiple and iterating approaches to a particu-
48ἐν δὲ τοῖς ῾τούτων᾿ δι’ ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουµένοις τοῦτο λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ χωρὶς καὶ
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούµενον. τὸ γὰρ κοῖλον κοινῇ µὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐpiὶ τοῦ σιµοῦ καὶ τοῦ ῥοικοῦ,
piροστιθέµενον δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἄλλα, τὸ µὲν τῇ ῥινὶ τὸ δὲ τῷ σκέλει, σηµαίνειν ἔνθα µὲν γὰρ τὸ
σιµόν, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ῥοικὸν σηµαίνει, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἰpiεῖν ῥὶς σιµὴ ἢ ῥὶς κοίλη. ἔτι οὐ δοτέον
τὴν λέξιν κατ’ εὐθύ ψεῦδος γάρ ἐστιν. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σιµὸν ῥὶς κοίλη ἀλλὰ ῥινὸς τοδί, οἷον piάθος,
ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄτοpiον εἰ ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιµὴ ῥίς ἐστιν ἔχουσα κοιλότητα ῥινός.
49Phil Corkum (Critical notice for Michail Peramatzis’s Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 2011, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013, 8) underlines that
the audience of the Metaphysics will have been familiar with the solutions reached in SE 13 and
31, i.e. there is a connection or even partial identity between the audiences of the Metaphysics
and the audience and students of the Sophistici Elenchi.
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lar question and problem as part of the teaching and learning practices and dis-
putational protocols. There is no hierarchical or systematically deducing order
of arguments, but the disputants approach the issue under consideration by tou-
ching upon different perspectives, by solving different objections, and by testing
different properties in regard to their status.
In our case, we have to ask if or how the snub discussion in the Sophistici Elen-
chi touches upon the argumentation about the inclusion of (a particular) matter
in the definition: since the fallacy is produced by an inaccuracy in the description
of the relation between snub and nose, it refers to the same range of questions
about including or excluding elements in or from the definition of an item: Is
snubness definable after all, if it depends in its definition on something that is
external to the property of being ‘concave’ a fact that can be exploited by a fal-
lacy that identifies ‘snub’ with a ‘nose that has the property of being snub’? Or is
‘concavity’ definable, whereas ‘snubness’ is not, because it is nothing other than
the enmattered instance of being concave?50
3 Snub and the Friends of the Forms
So far we have been following the entanglements of Aristotle’s scholarly practices
in wavelike movements. Thereby, the material has been rearranged, i.e. the dyna-
mic order of scholarly practices has become apparent, which directs the attention
of the disputants from one aspect and problem to the other.
However, there is one more move to make, i.e. towards a side path in the trial
runs to snubness: in Physics II, 2 Aristotle includes in his discussion about the
scope of the physicist in comparison with that of the mathematician a critique of
the Platonic theory of forms.
“We have distinguished, then, the different ways in which the term ‘nature’ is used.
The next point to consider is how the mathematician differs from the physicist.
Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, and
these are the subject-matter of mathematics. [..] Now the mathematician, though
he too treats of these things, nevertheless does not treat of them as the limits of
a physical body; nor does he consider the attributes indicated as the attributes
of such bodies. That is why he separates them; for in thought they are separable
from motion, and it makes no difference, nor does any falsity result, if they are
separated. The holders of the theory of Forms do the same, though they are not
aware of it; for they separate the objects of physics, which are less separable than
those of mathematics.” (Ph. II,2, 193b22-194a1, translated by R. P. Hardie and R.
50Balme considers the problem discussed in SE as not yet resolved: D. Balme, The Snub, in:
Ancient Philosophy 4, 1984, 1-8.
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K. Gaye)51
Here, Aristotle discusses which objects can be considered without motion, i.e.:
what, according to Aristotle, is not an object of physics. Snubness here does
not come into play until properties are contemplated which are indicative for
ontological relations and definitions.52 ‘Snub’ is, then, taken as an example for
objects from which matter cannot be abstracted, since it is the nose as the matter
component by which the form of the snubness achieves its specific shape (i.e. the
way in which noses are concave). Therefore, the matter is not separable from the
form – neither in re nor in the definition.53
In this context Aristotle refers to Platonic Academic discourses and presents
a certain continuity and similarity between the two institutions: the Platonic Aca-
demy and the Lykeion. Those who speak of ‘Forms’ treat physical objects by
seperating all kinetic, i.e. material, aspects from them. Aristotle makes clear that
he claims the leadership in the conceptualization of physics and in defining the
specific methods of the natural sciences by the assumption that the ‘Friends of
the Forms’ carry out the same operations, without however being aware of it. By
this it is implicitly supposed that because of the general possibility to separate
form aspects from matter components it is in some way possible and acceptable
– even in the case of physical objects – to do so, although the physical objects are
less separable from matter than mathematical objects.
Interestingly, Aristotle does not refer to the ‘Friends of the Forms’ in order
to exemplify false practices in Physics, but as an argumentum a maiore: It is in
fact without fault, he insinuates, to separate mathematical objects from matter,
while the members of the Platonic Academy separate even physical objects from
all matter aspects – however without being aware of it, i.e. without reflecting on
it methodologically.
But, why does he do that? What is the reason for adressing the ‘Friends of
the Forms’ in our context (i.e. in the context of the snub example)? First of all,
it entangles ongoing Academic discussions explicitly in his conceptualizing ap-
proaches to Physics. That means, that a scholarly debate between the school of
the Academy and the Lykeion is promoted; second, Aristotle claims the leader-
ship in defining and re-ordering of natural sciences since he denies that the ‘Fri-
51᾿Εpiεὶ δὲ διώρισται piοσαχῶς ἡ φύσις, µετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίνι διαφέρει ὁ µαθηµατικὸς τοῦ
φυσικοῦ (καὶ γὰρ ἐpiίpiεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώµατα καὶ µήκη καὶ στιγµάς, piερὶ ὧν σκοpiεῖ
ὁ µαθηµατικός)[..] piερὶ τούτων µὲν οὖν piραγµατεύεται καὶ ὁ µαθηµατικός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ
σώµατος piέρας ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὰ συµβεβηκότα θεωρεῖ ᾗ τοιούτοις οὖσι συµβέβηκεν διὸ καὶ χωρί-
ζει χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόντων.





ends of the Forms’ know what they are doing; third, he lays emphasis on the
importance of the snub example for basic epistemological discussions. Since Ari-
stotle does not refer to a particular passage in a written Platonic dialogue, the
impression is supported that the claim about the Platonists is contextualized in
the oral teaching and research contexts of the two institutions rather than as an
hermeneutical debate on the interpretation of texts; fourth, the consideration of
the forms can add something to the understanding of the relation between form
and matter in singular entities: and that is, that the attention is directed towards
the status of the enmattered form (enhylon eidos) and its separability.
4 Beyond the Corpus Aristotelicum
4.1 Theaetetus and His Socratic Snubness
As we have seen, cross-references to oral or written discussion contexts are not
restricted to the entanglements between different texts of the Corpus Aristote-
licum, but go beyond the limits of the Aristotelian pragmateiai and touch upon
Platonic dialogues and discussion contexts from the Platonic Academy.
In this perspective the snub nose in Aristotle is a recurring motif for the
ontological structure of a (sensible) tode ti. It functions as a recognizable motif
for a fundamental argumentational practice in first philosophy which postulates
sufficient reasons for the recognition of something whose definition is required.
I will argue in the last part of my paper that Aristotle takes up a question that
Plato presented and discussed in the Theaetetus (and elsewhere). As in the case
of the possible methodological reference to Plato’s Theaetetus, which we already
contemplated, the example of the snub nose leads us back from Ζ 5 to Academic
discussions, which are reflected and performed in the Theaetetus.
The instances of ‘snub’ as a school example are more concretely entangled
with Plato’s description of Theaetetus’ snubness than it might seem at first sight.
The verification of this claim allows us to go beyond the simple hypothesis that
Aristotle was inclined to use examples in the assumption that his audiences in
the Lykeion were acquainted with them, because they were frequently used in the
Academy.
It seems that it is not by chance or without thought that Aristotle used the
example for particular contexts. One hint at this is that Aristotle is concerned
with the topic of the Theaetetus in central passages of the Metaphysics and the
Physics and continues the Platonic challenge, as Plato refers to ‘snubness’ at the
beginning and end of his central epistemological dialogue, the topic of which
is the question: How it is possible to understand the very being of an object (in
Aristotelian terminology: the substance or what-it-is-to-be), on sufficient grounds
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and without the danger of error.
In the Theaetetus54 Plato argues that sensible or imaginary properties are
not suitable as parts of a definition in the proper sense of the word and that
one must distinguish between the identification of something by the recognition
of sensible features on the one hand and a real, sufficient recognition on the
other.55
Aristotle answers the question as to the difference between merely identifying
something and defining something in a proper sense in a different way and by
different methods from Plato. However, it is one of the merits of school examples
like the ‘snub nose’ that they can be transferred into another context and fulfill
their task in a flexible fashion.
Let us now read the snub case in the Theaetetus closely so that it becomes
plausible that (1) Aristotle chooses this text as a point of reference for his use
of ‘snub’ in Metaphysics Ζ and similar cases; and (2) that the argumentation in
the Theaetetus provides more than the mere image of a snub-nosed Theaetetus
and a snub-nosed Socrates but models the image and produces a basic shape of a
school example with a flexible, but certain meaning and function.
In Plato’s dialogues Socrates is imagined as a satyr-like figure, of which one of
the characteristics is the snubness of his nose. However, Socrates is not the only
protagonist whose outward appearance is specified by this feature. For the young
mathematician Theaetetus also has such a snub nose. The similarity between
the two is striking and thus becomes a subject matter at the beginning of the
dialogue.
Theaetetus is not only similar to Socrates in regard to his outward appearance
but is like no other pictured as Socrates’ younger self. At first glance one could
assume that the snubness is discounted as being of minor importance, however
this falls short of an analysis of the entanglemnts between different levels of
argumentation in Plato’s Theaetetus. For it is already in the Theaetetus that ‘snub’
becomes indicative of the question about how something can be distinguished
sufficiently from other objects of recognition.
At the beginning of the dialogue Theodorus introduces Theaetetus by saying
that “he is not beautiful” (οὐκ ἔστι καλός (Tht. 143e8) and equals Socrates with
regard to his snubness and his bulgy eyes, although these features are not as
54Commentaries and interpretations ad loc. which have been used for the development of
this interpretation are by F.M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and The
Sophist, Dover, 2003 [first published in 1935]; Timothy Chappell, Reading Plato’s Theaetetus,
Hackett, 2004; Rosemary Desjardins, The Rational Enterprise: Logos in Plato’s Theaetetus, SUNY,
1990; S. Benardete, Commentary to Plato’s Theaetetus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984;
Myles F. Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, transl. of the Theaetetus by M. J. Levett, revised by
Myles Burnyeat, Indianapolis 1990.
55This is the impact of the argumentation in Tht. 206b-210b: see my interpretation below.
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prominent in him as in Socrates (Tht. 143e8-144a1). However, with regard to his
character and intellect he is said to excel everyone else.
The very reference to the discrepancy between the lack of corporeal beauty
and an extraordinary inner beauty of the soul reminds the reader of Socrates
himself, who is described by this contrast in the Symposium in a memorable
image (Smp. 216d2-217a2). Thomas Alexander Szlezák discloses in a paper from
200456 the multiple entanglements regarding the characterization of the protago-
nist Theaetetus with other dialogues, and underlines that Theaetetus is presented
in the dialogical performance as a paradigm for Socrates’ successful midwifery
(maieutike techne).57
But again: this is not only a question of visual aspects and motifs but touches
upon fundamental philosophical issues in which Plato is interested: Not only for
the relation to the Symposium but also to the Charmides, Meno, Republic, So-
phistes, Parmenides (etc.) the field of reference is the battle of belief (doxa) and
rational knowledge (logos). In this battle the young Theaetetus is a central figure
among several of Plato’s dialogues, and – since it is reasonable58 to consider the
dialogues as reflexes of Academic discussions59 – he becomes central also in the
discussion in the Academy, where Plato discussed the issue again and again.60
These issues are negotiated and renegotiated in different contexts (and across
the dialogues) through the repetition of examples, argumentation practices, que-
56Thomas A. Szlezák: Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie: Das Bild des Dialektikers
in Platons späten Dialogen, Berlin 2004, 103-109.
57Alfred Dunshirn in his book on the Logos and the Logoi in Plato (Logos bei Platon als Spiel und
Ereignis, Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann 2010) has presented close connections between
the dialogues of the tetralogy Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophistes and Politicus, in which the character
Theaetetus is entangled in regard to multiple ethical and dialectical issues.
58Cf. on the ‘often said things’ (polythryleta) Dorothea Frede, Platon. Phaidon, 1999, 122, who
connects the expression only to earlier arguments from the Phaedo: 65d, 75c, 76d, 78d. Cf. al-
so Christoph Horn, Kritik der bisherigen Naturforschung und die Ideentheorie (95a-102a), in: J.
Müller (Hg.): Platon, Phaidon, Berlin: Akademie 2011, 127-142, cf.: p. 137f.
59Cf. also Gyburg Uhlmann, Metaphysics Ζ 4: Aristotle’s Arguments and his Audiences – Preli-
minary Studies on Audience-Driven Dynamics in Aristotle, in: Working Papers des SFB Episteme
in Bewegung, Working Paper No. 9, 2017.
60This approach adds up to David Sedleys convincing interpretation of the Theaetetus (The
Midwife of Platonism. Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaetetus, Oxford 2004) which describes the
Theaetetus as Plato’s account of the importance and influence of Socratic dialectics and the Plato-
nic theory of the Forms. Sedley claims that there is a second-order midwifery by which Socrates
brings to birth central elements of Platonism without however claiming the authorship for him-
self. If we take the context of the Platonic Academy and the audiences which are part of the
discussions in the Academy seriously, another horizon is opened up in which we can consider
the argumentational lines and waves as reflexes of the actual interaction between Plato and his
fellow philosophers and students. Below I will focus on the practices in which the definition of
sensible objects and other composites are at stake. The approach, however, could and should be
applied to further parts of the argumentations in the Theaetetus.
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stions, and models of solution.61
In the Theaetetus Socrates picks up the issue of the similarities between
Theaetetus and himself right at his first address to his younger discussion part-
ner, and places emphasis on the need to not only believe the assertion of such
a similarity but each time to critically call it into question and ask whether the
person who has made the claim is competent in the field (Tht. 144e3).
By doing so the central subject of the philosophical discussion is already
implicitly present and gives the snubness of Theaetetus the status of an episte-
mological leitmotif. This will become evident in the re-discussion of Theaetetus’
snub nose at the very end of the dialogue. For, in the concluding passage of the
dialogue, after sense perception, mere opinion (doxa), and true belief, and true
belief ‘with reason’ (meta logou) have been discussed as aspirants for the defini-
tion of true knowledge – after all this, again the discussion takes up the property
of Theaetetus’ snubness. Once again, this is not only a structural characteristic
and evidence of Plato’s true excellence as an author, but the entanglements bet-
ween the protagonists of the dialogue with the central theme of the dialogue go
beyond all this.
The argumentation, in which Socrates challenges the third definition (doxa
meta logou) has two parts: first, a series of arguments called “dream”62 discusses
the definition of “knowable” (episteta) and “not knowable” (ouk episteta). What is
accomplished is a discussion about the possibility to start at an absolute begin-
ning in order to achieve unerring knowledge. Aristotle picks up this question in
his Posterior Analytics – the entanglements of which with Platonic and Academic
practices are not yet sufficiently analyzed in scholarship.63
The second part presents considerations on the way in which a clear-cut di-
stinction between mere belief and knowledge could be achieved and consolidated
and discusses two options: (1) by representing that which has been recognized
in and through a verbal expression; or (2) through an exhaustive enumeration
of all features of the definiendum, or rather through indicating the specifically
distinguishing feature (i.e. the in Aristotelian terms the differentia specifica) (Tht.
208c4-6).
In this last approach to the question, in the course of which our example
has a crucial role, the question is discussed as to whether there is a sufficient
criterion to distinguish the thing that is to be defined from everything else (an
61Cf. Michael Erler, Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons. Übungsstücke zur Anleitung
im philosophischen Denken, Berlin/New York 1987, 81f.
62Cf. Myles Burnyeat, Introduction, in: id., The Theaetetus of Plato, 164ff.
63David Sedley has pointed out how Plato in the discussion of giving an exhaustive list as a can-
didate for knowledge/logos added to true opinion, rejects the “Presocratic bottom-up programme
for knowing the world by starting from primary elements simply given in direct experience” (The
Midwife of Platonism. Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaetetus, Oxford 2004, 160).
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interpreter of its distinctness, as Sokrates says (Sph. 209a6: τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος
ἑρµηνεία)). It complements and builds a contrast to the antecedent attempt to
give a definition by naming all features in an all-comprising list.64
It is characteristic for the second approach that Socrates directly constricts
the impact of the defining procedure to a certain meaning: If belief and knowled-
ge are to be distinguished on the basis of the assumption that knowledge adds
the specifically distinguishing aspect, then it seems that pure belief (doxa) will
only present something general (koinon), which is in no way more characteristic
of one object than of another one (Tht. 209a10f.). Is it thus true that an opini-
on about a single person comprises only characteristics of humans in general?
Or, is it rather true that someone who has a certain opinion of a person will
also have recognized specific features by which he can distinguish between dif-
ferent persons? Theaetetus accepts this assumption with the consequence that
the distinguishing criterion between opinion and knowledge has once again be-
en lost.
That means: Socrates compares the image of a person with the rational re-
cognition and grants the image (or: the imagination) the power to identify some-
thing specifically, too.65 At this point the snub example is applied.
“Socr. In fact, there will be no notion of Theaetetus in my mind, I suppose, until
this particular snubness has stamped and registered within me a record distinct
from all the other cases of snubness that I have seen; and so with every other part
of you. Then, if I meet you tomorrow, that trait will revive my memory and give
me a correct notion about you. Theaet. Quite true.” (Tht. 209c4-9, translated by
Francis C. Cornford))66
If this is true, there is no more need for the logos as a “conveyance of diffe-
rence” (hermeneia diaphorotetos (209a6). What has happened in the dialogical
movements is that – subtly – the search for elements (resp. principles) (stoich-
eia), which are expected to specifically distinguish between certain objects, has
64David Sedley names several possible meanings of logos as a basis for the whole third part and
assumes ‘definition’ to be the most likely and fitting meaning of logos (The Midwife of Platonism,
153). By considering the contemporary readership and audiences of Plato’s dialogues one can
add to this interpretation that different concepts of definition and the unity in multiplicity that
is required in a definition are tested and rejected in a way that is analogous to (but of course not
identical with) Aristotle’s approaches to describe the unity of definitions of compounds in his
Metaphysics.
65Burnyeat underlines that this argumentation builds on what has been achieved as a result in
the discussion of the wax-block-image: Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, 92 and 228-234.
66 Α᾿λλ’ οὐ piρότερόν γε, οἶµαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐµοὶ δοξασθήσεται, piρὶν ἂν ἡ σιµότης αὕτη τῶν
ἄλλων σιµοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι µνηµεῖον piαρ’ ἐµοὶ ἐνσηµηναµένη κατάθηται—καὶ
τἆλλα οὕτω ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ — ἥ µε, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀpiαντήσω, ἀναµνήσει καὶ piοιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν
piερὶ σοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Α᾿ληθέστατα.
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been transferred into the search for memorials (mnemeia), i.e. features that are
capable of identifying something and by which our memory can accomplish the
individual identification of something or someone.
Just as it has become obvious in the preceding argumentation that the integri-
ty of sensible features cannot be taken as knowledge, there are sufficient reasons
to doubt that by the identification of external features a sufficiently specific lo-
gos has been accomplished. As long as the search for defining characteristics
takes place on the level of imagination and with memorable images, the outcome
can never be true knowledge, which needs to be conceptual. The problem in the
last approach of the Theaetetus is that the logos that is tested to be added to
true beliefs is taken to be just another element alongside the sensible characte-
ristics.
However, doubts about the identity of knowledge and (context-dependent)
identification are nourished in many related passages throughout the Corpus
Platonicum, especially in the passage in the Republic where Socrates introdu-
ces the distinction between real philosophers in the primary sense of the word
and people who claim to be philosophers but are in fact only lovers of sights (R.
477eff.).
In the Theaetetus the discussion of the example ends in aporia. However, by
contextualizing the example in the Platonic, so to speak, discussion rooms, the
example can unfold its capacity to direct reasoning to the relevant aspects of ra-
tional definitions or the lack of these aspects in approaches which are essentially
imaginary (in the sense of: bound to imagination).
By using the snub-example Plato invokes discussions on the process of defi-
ning the very essence of singular objects of knowledge inside the dialogues and
inside the walls of the Academy. Granted, Plato does not use the snub nose as
example for objects, whose definition is prevented or impeded by matter aspects
that are inseparable from the object as Aristotle does. The connection to Aristot-
le’s use of the example, though, is that difficulties will arise if one tries to define
singular things which are compounds of form and matter and that it is a tough
question to deal with the issue of how it is possible to achieve knowledge of those
objects in some sense of the word (if not in the primary sense).
These are aspects which Aristotle could approach and take up directly. They
were at the disposal of every member of Plato’s Academy and could therefore be
used as elements of a dynamic school repertoire in discussions dealing with the
challenge of defining something sufficiently.
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5 Conclusions: Discussion Practices in the Acade-
my
Already in Plato – in his dialogues and presumably also in the oral discussions of
the Academy – Theaetetus becomes an example for philosophical disputational
practices. E.g. the proposition “Theaetetus flies” is used as material in order to
sound out the differences between true and false propositions.67
Aristotle ties up to these discussion practices and habits when he uses his
snub example and endows it with basic argumentational functions. For, it is used
in order to tackle the problem of conceptual definitions of something whose
being has the struture of ‘this in that’ (tode en tôide). The snub nose carries this
compoundness in an easily accessible form.
Granted, the choice of examples in a school institution is somehow random.
Why does Aristotle use ‘Kallias’ as an example for a tode ti, a singular entity, in-
stead of picking Simmias for this purpose? The answer to questions like that can
never be absolute, or provided with sufficient reasons. What is possible, however,
is to explore contexts and narratives of origins and practices. Just like quotations,
examples refer to a certain author and a certain context of usage, to be specific:
they do so as long as they are not completely transferred and digested in the
repertoire of the argumentational practices of a tradition or institution. In the
case of Aristotle’s pragmateiai it is probable that the contexts in which Plato and
other members of the Academy developed and made use of particular examples
are still sensible or at least capable of being re-contextualized.
In this paper I have argued that Aristotle by using snubness as an example,
takes up discussions about the definability and epistemic recognizability of sin-
gular entities, which were lively and ongoing in Plato’s Academy and which are
mirrored in the reflections of Theaetetus’ snubness in Plato’s dialogue Theae-
tetus. Aristotle, though, develops his own agenda and his own questions and
answers and by doing this he distinguishes himself from his teacher and ties up
to him.
The example of the snub nose works without the implicit reference to certain
(extant) texts and certain situations in Academic contexts. This potential to be
decontextualized and re-contextualized without losing its epistemic functions is
the condicio sine qua non for every scholarly use of examples.
However, if the reference and former context or contexts are remembered and
made explicit again, yet another level of discussion culture and entanglements in
the discussions, the reflexes of which we find in the Metaphysics, can be added,
67Cf. David Wiggins, Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato’s Problem of Non-Being, in G. Vla-
stos, ed., Plato I: A Collection of Critical Essays, Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Garden
City, NY, Anchor Books 1971, 268—303.
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since without these practices of transfer and re-contextualizations the historical
space of discussions, which was filled by Plato and Aristotle in their school insti-
tutions and in which their different discourses intersect, and the idea of the role
of the audiences, remain vague.
30
